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PRACTICAL GROUNDS FOR BELIEF: 
 KANT AND JAMES ON RELIGION 
 
 
Thus I had to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith [Glauben1] (Kant: B xxx). 
Adopt your hypothesis, and see how it agrees with life – That is faith. As Kant says I have swept 
away knowledge in order to make room for Faith; and that seems to me an absolutely sound and 
healthy position (James: Letter to Henry William Rankin, 12th June 1897, WB: 252). 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Theoretical reason can leave certain questions unsettled. Faced with the incapacity of 
theoretical reason to decide some matter, some thinkers argue that there are practical 
grounds to believe. This paper contrasts two such approaches, looking at how Kant and James 
defend religious belief on practical grounds. 
On the face of it, Kant and James appear to hold similar positions on religious belief. Both 
limit the claims of theoretical knowledge, while admitting practical grounds for belief (and 
specifically moral grounds for religious belief). For this reason, many scholars have commented 
on the connections between Kant and James’s positions.2 However, there is an important 
difference between their two accounts, which this paper aims to bring to light. Though both 
Kant and James allow us to adopt beliefs without evidence, James holds that these beliefs are 
open to subsequent revision in light of evidence in a way that Kant does not. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. We begin by outlining Kant's treatment of God in 
The Critique of Practical Reason (§I). We show that for Kant, belief in God is an a priori postulate 
of practical reason. We then lay out James's account of religious belief from 'The Will to 
Believe' and other places (§II). We offer a reading of James, where he is neither a fideist nor 
an evidentialist; while he thinks we can be justified in adopting beliefs without evidence, he 
                                            
1 ‘Glauben’ can be translated as either ‘faith’ or ‘belief’. In this paper, we will use all three terms interchangeably. 
2 Kuklick, for instance, sees pragmatism as a form of neo-Kantianism, and labels James as the most neo-Kantian 
of the pragmatists (Kuklick 1977: 334). Carlson claims that James, like Kant, both postulates the existence of 
God for the sake of morality, and that he legitimates this belief on practical grounds which are immune to 
empirical evidence (Carlson 1997: 381). Slater holds that, like Kant, James sees religion as practically necessary 
to morality (Slater 2009: 13), and Pihlström builds his interpretation of James around his similarity to Kant (cf. 
Pihlström 2014 for a recent outline). James himself rarely compared himself to Kant or connected his philosophy 
with Kantianism. Some eight years after the epitaph quote, in a letter to his Kantian colleague, James writes: 
'[Pragmatism] is irreconcilable with anything in Kant […] only the most superficial resemblances obtaining' 
(Letter to Munsterberg, 16th March 1905, quoted in Perry, vol. II: 469). 
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maintains that some of these beliefs remain responsive to subsequent evidence. With Kant 
and James’ accounts on the table, we turn to lay out what we take to be the key differences 
between them (§III): We claim that James allows more of a role for evidence when assessing 
religious belief, and argue that for James whether or not a (religious) belief works counts in 
favour of its truth. We end by saying something about the upshot of these differences.  
 
§ I: KANT ON GOD AS A PRACTICAL POSTULATE 
 
In the first Critique, Kant claims that theoretical reason cannot settle the issue of whether or 
not there is a God. According to Kant, the traditional arguments for the existence of God fail 
(A 591-630/B 619-658). Moreover, he claims that: 
[...] all attempts of a merely speculative use of reason in regard to theology are entirely fruitless 
and by their internal constitution null and nugatory, […] For all synthetic principles of 
understanding are of immanent use; but for the cognition of a highest being a transcendent use of 
them would be required, for which our understanding is not equipped at all (A 636/B 664). 
Transcendental idealism confines our knowledge to the world of experience, and the concept 
of God transcends this. For instance, Kant claims that God – as the original author of the 
world – must be unconditioned. Thus, he argues that God cannot show up in any possible 
experience, as if God did, God would then be subject to the empirical law of causality and 
thereby conditioned (A 636-7/B 664-5). God is an example of a concept which concerns an 
object that lies beyond the limits of all possible experience.3 As such, experience can provide 
neither evidence for or against the existence of God, and the question of God’s existence lies 
beyond the scope of theoretical reason.  
Having argued that theoretical reason cannot settle the issue of God’s existence, Kant proposes 
that practical reason can provide grounds for religious belief. Kant’s argument here is 
notoriously hard to pin down. In what follows, we lay out the basics of his argument as it 
occurs in the second Critique.4 Though we will attempt to bring some clarity to Kant’s 
argument, our primary aim is simply to illuminate his general account of the practical grounds 
for belief, before turning to James in the next section. 
Famously, Kant insists that we ought to do the right thing for its own sake. However, as we 
are sensibly affected rational beings – rational animals – we also seek and require happiness. 
According to Kant, doing the right thing for its own sake makes us worthy of happiness, but in 
no way guarantees that we will actually be happy. This tension worries Kant. Kant argues not 
only that the moral person is worthy of happiness, but that happiness: 
                                            
3 Kant calls such concepts ‘transcendental ideas’. Another example is the soul; see for instance, Kant’s discussion 
at A 399-402 in the Paralogisms. 
4 Kant provides an alternative account of the highest good in the first Critique; see A 633-4/B 661-2; A 806-19/B 
834-47. 
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[…] is also required, and […] not merely in the partial eyes of a person who makes himself an end 
but even in the judgement of an impartial reason (V: 110.24-6). 
This is to say that, it is not just that we want to be both worthy of happiness and happy (in 
proportion to worthiness), but that God would also want this. To require happiness, and to 
be worthy of it, but not to receive it, would be inconsistent with the perfect volition of an all-
powerful being (V: 110.22-31). 
It is through these thoughts that Kant is lead to the idea of the highest good, which he defines 
as: 
Happiness distributed in exact proportion to morality (as the worth of a person and his worthiness 
to be happy) (V: 110.33-4).5 
Kant then makes the claim that practical reason requires that we seek this highest good. Were 
it impossible to attain the highest good, according to Kant, then practical reason – and the 
moral law along with it – would be false: 
Now, since the promotion of the highest good, which contains this connection in its concept, is an 
a priori necessary object of our will and inseparably bound up with the moral law, the impossibility 
of the first must prove the falsity of the second. If, therefore, the highest good is impossible in 
accordance with practical rules, then the moral law, which commands us to promote it, must be 
fantastic and directed to empty imaginary ends and must therefore in itself be false (V: 114.1-9). 
The exact relationship between the highest good and practical reason is notoriously difficult 
to determine. In this account of the highest good, we have tried to stay relatively close to the 
text of the second Critique. It is worth noting though, that not everyone agrees with this 
interpretation. There are several different plausible readings of Kant’s argument for the 
highest good, and we do not seek to adjudicate between them here (either textually or 
philosophically).6 Here, our concern is primarily with how Kant goes about solving an apparent 
tension in his account of the highest good. 
Kant sets up morality and happiness as “quite heterogeneous” [ganz ungleichartig] (V: 112.29); 
we are meant to do the right thing for its own sake, with no guarantee that it will make us 
happy. In fact, as Kant conceives it, there is:  
[…] not the least ground in the moral law for a necessary connection between the morality and 
the proportionate happiness of a being belonging to the world (V: 124. 30-2). 
This is in part due to Kant’s conception of nature, which he views as operating operates 
independently of the moral law: 
                                            
5 Kant notes that the concept of the highest good contains an ambiguity: the supreme highest good is virtue, 
whereas the complete highest good is happiness distributed in exact proportion to morality (V: 110.12-111.5). 
Following Kant, we will continue to refer to the complete highest good as the highest good. 
6 For what it is worth, we follow Fugate in thinking that the text itself is ambiguous: “the sheer number of 
attempts Kant made to clarify the argument renders it likely that several different strategies were employed at 
different times” (2014: 140). See Beck (1960) and Wood (1970) for two classic competing interpretations of the 
highest good, and Fugate (2014) for a new interpretation of the highest good, which sees it as a way of striving 
for virtue. 
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[Virtue being the efficient cause of happiness is] impossible because any practical connection of 
causes and effects in the world, as a result of the determination of the will, does not depend upon 
the moral dispositions of the will but upon knowledge of the laws of nature and the physical ability 
to use them for one's purposes; consequently, no necessary connection of happiness with virtue in 
the world, adequate to the highest good, can be expected from the most meticulous observance 
of moral laws. (V. 113.30 – 114.1) 
Given this set up, the possibility of the highest good (happiness in exact proportion to moral 
worthiness) is problematic. Nonetheless, Kant holds that we have a duty to promote the 
highest good (V: 125.25) and – because ought implies can – this means that the highest good 
must be possible (V: 125.3-4).  
How then is the highest good possible? Kant’s solution involves God.7 God makes it possible 
that we receive happiness in proportion to our worthiness (V: 124.7 – 125.30). As Kant puts 
it, the highest good is only “possible insofar as a supreme cause of nature having a causality in 
keeping with moral disposition is assumed” (V: 125.27-9).8 Otherwise expressed, Kant’s claim 
is that while nature cannot make it possible that we will be happy in exact proportion to 
worth, God can.9 In order to conceive of the highest good as possible then, we have to believe 
in God. 
There are two key issues which need to be clarified here. The first concerns the way in which 
Kant considers the highest good possible. From what we have seen, it is clear that Kant thinks 
that we have a duty to promote the highest good, and that belief in God makes this possible. 
But it is not yet clear what this possibility refers to.10 The ambiguity arises when we look 
closer, for instance, at the following claim: 
[…] we ought to strive to promote the highest good (which must therefore be possible) (V. 125. 
3-4).  
The ambiguity is as follows: Is Kant’s claim is that it must be possible to strive to promote the 
highest good; or that must be possible to actually attain or realise it?11 The text is slightly 
ambiguous on this, but we think that Kant’s discussion of the immortality of the soul provides 
some illumination. 
Kant claims that the highest good requires the complete conformity of our dispositions with 
the moral law (V: 122.5-7). The complete conformity of the will with the moral law is what 
Kant calls holiness, and Kant is quite clear that sensible rational beings like us cannot attain 
such a state (V: 122.9-12). Nevertheless, striving towards holiness is practically required, and 
thus Kant claims that it is “necessary to assume such a practical progress [towards holiness] 
                                            
7 It also involves an assumption of the immortality of the soul, which we shall discuss shortly. 
8 Kant claims us that we cannot think of God as grounding our obligation to follow the moral law (V: 125.34-
126.1), but instead that God is required in order to make the highest good practically possible (V: 126.1-13). 
9 There is a possible challenge to Kant here. Though it might be clear that nature cannot guarantee happiness in 
exact proportion to virtue, it is not clear that this would be impossible. We might, for instance, find historical 
occasions in which happiness does exist in exact proportion to worth. To fully consider this challenge, we would 
have to look in much more detail at Kant’s conception of nature, and so we leave this challenge aside here. 
10 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for prompting us to clarify this. 
11 Willashek (2010: 180n15) draws attention to a similar ambiguity in the text. 
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as the real object of our will” (V: 122.15-16). This endless progress, he argues, is only possible 
on the presupposition of the immortality of the soul (V: 122.17-20). Thus, Kant concludes 
that practical reason not only gives us grounds to believe in the existence of God, but also 
grounds for believing in the immortality of the soul. 
How does this help with the issue at hand? While it is relatively clear that we must strive 
towards realising the highest good, it is unclear whether, and in what sense, we should regard 
the realisation of the highest good as possible. The fact that the highest good requires the 
assumption of immortality indicates that it is unlikely to ever be realised in the empirical world 
(which occurs in space and time).12 As Kant notes, a person: 
[…] may hope for a further uninterrupted continuance of this progress [towards holiness], 
however long his existence may last, even beyond this life; and thus he cannot hope, either here 
or in any foreseeable future moment of his existence, to be fully adequate to God’s will […] he 
can hope to be so only in the endlessness of his duration (V: 123.17 – 124.3). 
This passage suggests that the realisation of the highest good might not be possible, but that 
we can strive towards it and hope, in the endlessness of our duration, that we might achieve 
it.13 
In sum then, we have a duty to strive to promote the highest good, and as such are entitled 
to regard this striving as possible, but it is not clear that we must regard the realisation of the 
highest good as possible.14 
The second issue which needs to be clarified concerns the relationship between the highest 
good and the belief in God.15 It is clear that Kant does not think that we first have to believe 
in the existence of God, and that the need to promote the highest good follows from this. 
But neither does Kant seem to believe that the opposite is the case, and that belief in God 
follows from our duty to promote the highest good. This would make the relation sound too 
temporal. Instead, Kant seems to argue that we have a duty to promote the highest good, and 
this is inseparably caught up with the belief in the existence of God. This inseparability is clear 
in the following passage: 
                                            
12 Another option would be to realise the highest good in the noumenal world, but this comes with difficulties 
of its own. For one, it is not clear that we are individual selves with sensible desires in the noumenal world, and 
as such, it is not clear that the highest good – happiness in exact proportion to virtue – could be realised there.  
13 For an alternative treatment of this, which recommends against using hope as the relevant doxastic state, see 
Willaschek (2010: 180-1). One question that arises from our reading is that, if we can only hope that the highest 
good can be realised, then perhaps we can only hope – rather than believe – that God exists or that the soul is 
immortal. However, this does not seem to follow. Whether or not the highest good is fully realisable, we still 
need God and the immortality of the soul to make striving towards it possible. Otherwise expressed, it seems 
possible to believe that we ought to promote the highest good, believe in God (who makes this possible), but 
only hope that the highest good can be fully realised. See also Gardner (2006: 266-7), who notes that Kant himself 
claims that hope is insufficient here, but that this “assertion is not explained or justified” (Gardner 2006: 267). 
14 Willaschek (2010: 181n15) has argued that the possibility to promote the highest good to the utmost of our 
capacity (rather to actually realise it) follows from the duty to promote the highest good to the utmost of our 
capacities, but that the commitment to the postulates themselves does not seem to follow from this. We suspect 
that this is correct, and that it reveals a gap in Kant’s thinking about the highest good. Of course, one could also 
think that this supposed gap counts against our reading, but we will leave this interpretive issue aside here. 
15 Again, we are grateful to an anonymous referee for asking us to clarify this issue. 
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Now, it was a duty for us to promote the highest good; hence there is us not merely the warrant 
but also the necessity, as a need connected with duty, to presuppose the possibility of this highest 
good, which since it is possible only under the condition of the existence of God, connects the 
presupposition of the existence of God inseparably with duty; that is, it is morally necessary to 
assume the existence of God (V: 125.25-30). 
Here, Kant suggests that our duty to promote the highest good requires us to believe in its 
possibility, and that this in turn is inseparably linked with belief in the existence of God. 
In summary then, Kant thinks that we have practical – rather than theoretical – grounds for 
belief in the existence of God. Kant calls this special kind of belief a postulate of practical reason, 
where a postulate is: 
[…] a theoretical proposition, though one not demonstrable as such, insofar as it is attached 
inseparably to an a priori unconditionally valid practical law (V: 122. 23-5). 
Theoretical reason leaves open whether or not there is a God, as Kant contends that neither 
pure reason nor experience can settle the issue either way. The existence of God thus 
remains possible, and our duty to promote the highest good makes belief in God necessary, 
on practical grounds. Of course, there is much more that can be said here. And there is a lot 
which remains opaque in Kant’s account of the highest good and its connection to the 
postulates.  For our purposes though, the key point is as follows: according to Kant, belief in 
God is an a priori postulate of practical reason.16 
One of the potential benefits of Kant’s position is that religious belief is insulated from the 
world of experience. This relates to a general feature of Kant’s philosophy. Kant was worried 
about the threat that a deterministic efficient causal conception of nature posed to morality. 
One key aspect of this problem concerns our freedom. If everything is determined in an 
efficient causal way, then our freedom (and morality along with it) might be an illusion. 
Transcendental idealism offers a solution to this, in that it accepts that the empirical world is 
governed by deterministic natural laws, but maintains a space for freedom in the noumenal.17 
We can see a similar line of thought elsewhere in Kant. In his famous discussion at the start 
of Groundwork II, he claims that even if we have never experienced an action done from pure 
duty, that this does not call into question the correctness of morality (IV: 406.5 – 408.11). 
In this way, Kant hopes to secure the possibility of moral action, no matter how the world of 
experience might be. And through making belief in God a practical postulate, he does 
something similar concerning religion. To promote the highest good is a duty. Fulfilling this 
duty requires the possibility of progress towards holiness, and of happiness in exact 
proportion to virtue. While neither of these are found in the empirical world, our duty to 
promote the highest good makes belief in them necessary, which gives us practical grounds 
to believe in the immortality of the soul and the existence of God. This is related to Kant’s 
claim to have denied knowledge to make room for faith: Theoretical reason left open whether 
                                            
16 For a fuller account of belief in Kant, see Chignell (2007). 
17 See: A 557/B 585; IV: 457.16-19; V: 99.12-19. 
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or not there is a God, and practical reason shows that God is an a priori practically necessary 
belief.18 
However, there are aspects of this strategy which will concern the pragmatist. Pragmatists 
hold that all beliefs are habits of action which are revisable in the light of appropriate 
experience.19 As we shall see in the next section, though James is similar to Kant in arguing 
that we can adopt beliefs on practical grounds, he wants these beliefs to remain responsive 
to the world in a way that Kant does not.20  
 
§II: JAMES ON RELIGIOUS BELIEF AND EVIDENCE 
 
James appears similar to Kant in that he also claims to “make room for faith” by limiting 
knowledge (1897, WB: 252). For Kant, practical reason provides us with grounds to hold 
religious belief when theoretical reason cannot, and we shall see that James makes the same 
kind of move. But alongside these similarities, there are some important differences in their 
accounts. 
Whereas Kant contends that belief in God is a necessary and a priori postulate of practical 
reason, James’s picture is – unsurprisingly – more pragmatic. The practical defence of religious 
belief that James mounts centres on the notion that certain beliefs, which are vitally important 
to our practical lives, must be adopted and acted under before they can be assessed as true 
or false. Religious belief is an obvious example of such a case, and this can be seen most clearly 
in James’s will-to-believe argument, which this section will outline. 
James’s will-to-believe thesis was aimed at combatting the influence of strictly materialistic 
thinkers, such as W. K. Clifford. Such thinkers dismissed the legitimacy of religious belief on 
the grounds that there was – and could be no – theoretical or empirical evidence for adopting 
it. Clifford’s evidentialism is encapsulated nicely in his famous quote that “it is wrong, always 
and for everyone, to believe anything on insufficient evidence”. For Clifford, in fact, this 
injunction was not just of epistemic importance, but was also morally and practically 
important. By letting ourselves believe what we want without sufficient evidence, we are not 
only doing a disservice to ourselves, but weakening the epistemic norms of the whole race. 
                                            
18 There is one empirical element to Kant’s discussion of the highest good, namely the fact that we are sensible 
creatures that seek happiness. 
19 There are additional issues here about whether the necessity of a belief justifies it; see, for instance Stern (2000: 
85-6; 2015: 221), Strawson (2010: 64), and Peirce (1902, CP 2:113). We think that this is an interesting topic, 
but one that is beyond the scope of this paper. 
20 It is worth noting that even though the pragmatists reject that any belief can be said to be indubitable, they 
are not sceptics. If we do not have sufficient reason to doubt a belief, then we should continue to hold it as true, 
and act accordingly. But we retain a healthy fallibilism about our beliefs, and know that they could be revised in 
the future. According to Putnam, this fallibilism combined with anti-skepticism is one of pragmatism’s most 
defining characteristics (Putnam, 1994: 152) Cf. Peirce (1898, CP5.589; 1905, CP5.416), and James (1896, WB: 
20-24; 33) 
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We make ourselves, and those around us, more credulous, and more likely to adopt false 
beliefs in the future (Clifford, 1886: 169-175). 
James’s rejection of Clifford’s evidentialism might tempt us to think of him as a fideist – 
someone who thinks that religious belief has no connection to evidence.21 In actual fact, James 
is sensitive to many of Clifford’s concerns, and wants our religious beliefs to be subject to the 
same epistemic norms as our other beliefs.22 Nonetheless, James does hold that certain 
practically important beliefs can be legitimately adopted without evidence. Moreover, James 
holds that in some of these cases, the adoption of the belief in question is what allows evidence 
of its truth or falsity to become accessible. It is for this reason that James accuses Cliffordian 
evidentialism of demonstrating an “insane logic”, which would not only prevent us from 
believing on faith things which are practically vital to our lives, but would also prevent us from 
accessing the evidence required to assess these beliefs (1896, WB: 29).23 
We will now run through the core of James’s will-to-believe argument. For our purposes, the 
central point is that there are certain beliefs which we can legitimately adopt on practical – 
rather than theoretical – grounds. James places a great deal of restrictions on what sort of 
beliefs can be so adopted, and in what contexts. Firstly, he is clear that beliefs which can be 
decided on intellectual or empirical grounds should not be adopted on practical grounds. We 
cannot become climate change deniers just because we don’t want to worry ourselves about 
climate change. We should not believe 2 + 2 = 5, no matter how much personal satisfaction 
                                            
21 Cf. Kuklick (1997: xx), who sees James's pragmatism as a form of fideism. Dooley (1972) suggests that James's 
argument shows that we can believe on passional rather than evidential grounds, in part because such beliefs 
have the potential to alter reality (Dooley 1972: 143, 149). Nathanson (1982) goes further, holding that James 
gives us non-evidential reasons to adopt certain beliefs even when there is evidence to suggest that they are false 
(Nathanson 1982: 577). Gale (1999) seems to agree, suggesting that, according to James, we can be justified in 
believing metaphysical or religious hypotheses due to the “beneficial consequences of so believing” (1999: 93), 
even in “the teeth of quite powerful contrary evidence” (1999: 100). If Nathanson and Gale are correct, the will-
to-believe doctrine would allow us to believe whatever we wanted, regardless of evidence, if it was sufficiently 
beneficial to us to so believe. This position would be disastrous, not only because it is a very problematic view, 
but also because this is precisely the interpretation of the will-to-believe thesis which James vehemently denied. 
22 Klein (2015) has recently argued that there are two distinctions at play in James's paper: the first concerns 
evidentialism and anti-evidentialism, whereas the second concerns whether the epistemology adopted in cases 
such as religious belief is the same as that adopted in other cases, such as science. Klein holds that James argues 
for the position that religious beliefs must be subject to the same epistemic norms as other beliefs, but suggests 
that James is silent on the evidentialism issue (see Klein 2015: 81n20). Dunham (2014) agrees with Klein on this 
point. We are sympathetic towards what Klein calls a unitary reading of James, in which religious and scientific 
belief share a similar epistemology, but we will not make that case here. Instead we focus our efforts to argue, 
pace Klein, that James is does have something to say about the way evidence relates to beliefs adopted on 
practical grounds. 
23 There is thus a sense in which James holds a sort of evidentialism. Though he holds that religious beliefs can 
be adopted without evidence, he also holds that they are open to revision or rejection in the face of evidence 
which is brought to light later. Others have defended a stronger evidentialist reading of James. Weintraub (2003) 
also thinks that, despite James's stance against Clifford, he ought not be thought of as a fideist, but as a kind of 
evidentialist (Weintraub 2003: 108). However, Weintraub holds that James's evidentialism fails because it 
requires that we alter our criteria for evidence for certain important beliefs, such as religious beliefs (2003: 115). 
Welchman argues that James should be read as advocating a form of auto-experimentation, where the agent is 
both the test-subject and the researcher (2006: 234). This is perhaps closest to our reading of James, as will be 
shown in the final section. Aikin (2014) rejects both kinds of evidentialist approach, though he is not fully clear 
why (2014: 198n8). Aikin himself holds that James's argument supports a kind of evidentialist reading, but against 
James's own intentions. James, on Aikin's reading, is supposed to be defending faith against evidentialism, and 
thus James's evidentialism is taken to be accidental, and a critical failure of his account (Aikin 2014: 153). 
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it may bring us. Such matters of fact, and relations between ideas, we are “impotent” not to 
believe (1896, WB: 16). It is solely in cases in which our theoretical reason is insufficient for 
deciding between two (or more) equally plausible beliefs that James permits us to adopt a 
belief on practical grounds.24 
Once it is clear that a belief cannot be settled on theoretical grounds, there are three more 
criteria which it must meet for it to be legitimately adoptable on practical grounds: the option 
must be live, forced, and momentous. An option is live if it is salient or relevant in a given context, 
such that someone would be willing to act on it. This means that the belief must be coherent 
with our collection of already held beliefs, and it must be possible and plausible, at least to the 
person adopting it. It was not a choice for most people in nineteenth century America 
whether or not to be a Muslim or a Hindu. It was a live issue whether or not to be a Christian. 
As such, there are not only personal, but also cultural elements which determine the liveness 
of a given option. An option is forced if there are only a set number of choices, and one cannot 
abstain from a decision. The obvious example James offers is any “dilemma based on a 
complete logical disjunction”. Given a vote between two candidates, I might choose to abstain, 
or to spoil my ballot. However, I cannot abstain on the decision of whether or not God exists. 
I either believe or I do not.25 An option is momentous if my choice whether or not to believe 
will make a significant practical difference to my life. Believing or not believing in God will 
radically shape the way one organises their moral and practical life, and the way in which one 
looks at their place in the universe (1896, WB: 14-15). When we have met these three criteria, 
James asserts, we have the right to adopt the belief on practical grounds: “we have the right 
to believe at our own risk any hypothesis that is live enough to tempt our will” (1896, WB: 
32). 
James’s talk of adopting religious beliefs as ‘hypotheses’ here is important to note. This choice 
of word is indicative of James’s insistence that, once adopted on practical grounds, our 
religious beliefs should be just as susceptible as other beliefs to revision and assessment in the 
light of subsequent experience. In fact, James defines “faith” in these scientific terms: 
Faith is synonymous with working hypothesis. The only difference is that while some hypotheses 
can be refuted in five minutes, others may defy ages. [… These theories] may exhaust the labors 
of generations in their corroboration, each tester of their truth proceeding in this simple way – 
that he acts as if it were true, and expects the result to disappoint him if his assumption is false. 
The longer disappointment is delayed, the stronger grows his faith in his theory (1882, WB: 79). 
                                            
24 This is not restricted to religious or moral cases, however. James is quite clear that in scientific inquiry we 
often adopt beliefs as regulative assumptions, or as hypotheses, in much the same way as we do in moral or 
religious case. Thus, James accuses Clifford of being such a strict evidentialist that he goes against his own stated 
empiricism, seeing as the adoption of beliefs on insufficient evidential grounds is an important part of scientific 
inquiry. Klein (2015) draws this out nicely. 
25 There is no religious middle ground for the pragmatist, according James, as the agnostic is for all practical 
purposes an atheist (1896, WB: 20, 30; 1895, WB: 50-51). As James puts it, in certain questions “[t]he universe 
will have no neutrals” (1882, WB: 88-89). 
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James uses the words ‘belief’ and ‘hypothesis’ somewhat interchangeably, a fact which has not 
escaped the notice of some critics.26 This equivocation is not without reason, however. For 
James, a hypothesis is something that we adopt, which guides our action, and which we 
confirm, deny, or revise in the light of subsequent experience. For the pragmatist, beliefs too 
are guides for action, which are always revisable in the light of subsequent experience. There 
is much more that could be said about this, but we will leave this issue aside here.27  
We might distinguish two significant classes of will-to-believe cases. The first are cases in 
which the adoption of the belief gives us access to the evidence by which the belief can be 
assessed. James’s (imperfect) example is friendship. If I want to know whether or not you and 
I are friends, I cannot “stand aloof, and refuse to budge an inch until I have objective evidence”. 
If I do not assume friendship, and act accordingly, I am unlikely to ever experience the evidence 
which will confirm that the friendship exists. As such, it is the adoption of the belief in the 
friendship itself which allows me to access the evidence relevant to assessing it (1896, WB: 
28-9). On practical grounds – I want to be your friend! – I adopt the belief that we are friends 
on insufficient evidence, and as such make myself open to the evidence needed to assess the 
belief.28 
The second class of will-to-believe cases are those in which the adoption of the belief 
contributes to the state of affairs which makes it true. James uses the case of a climber stuck 
in the mountains (1882, WB: 80-2; 1895, WB: 53-4). The climber must jump across a chasm 
in order to survive. If she believes that she can make the jump, then she will gain the 
confidence required to make the leap across the chasm. If she believes that she cannot make 
the jump, she will lack the required confidence, and fall to her death. In either case, adopting 
the belief brings about the state of affairs which makes that belief true: 
[…] you make one or the other of two possible universes true by your trust or mistrust – both 
universes having been only maybes […] before you contributed your act (WB: 54).  
On practical grounds – she wants to live! – it is permitted for the climber to adopt the belief 
that she can make it across the chasm, despite the fact that there is insufficient evidence to 
support that belief at the time of its adoption. In doing so, her faith, as James puts it, “creates 
its own verification” by contributing to the state of affairs which makes it true (1882, WB: 80). 
These types of case allow James to distinguish between two basic relationships that a belief 
can have to evidence. In the cases which we typically take to be paradigmatic, there is sufficient 
                                            
26 Aikin (2014) for instance, holds that what James’s will-to-believe argument gets him is the proscription that in 
certain cases it is legitimate to act as-if one beliefs a proposition prior to the evidence, not that it is legitimate 
to believe such propositions. 
27 It is worth noting that Kant also talks of hypotheses, and differentiates them from the postulates of practical 
reason. For Kant, hypotheses are permissible claims of theoretical reason, where the postulates – as we have 
seen – are inseparably connected to necessary claims of practical reason. For a fuller account of this difference, 
see Willaschek (2010: 184-5). 
28 James’s example is imperfect for two reasons: firstly, it is not clear in what way the friendship case is sufficiently 
live, forced, and momentous, and so a legitimate candidate for adoption on practical grounds; and secondly, it is 
not clear in what ways the friendship pre-exists the adoption of the belief, and in what ways the adoption of the 
belief calls the friendship into existence. Thus, it is not clear whether the friendship case belongs to this or the 
second class of will-to-believe cases. 
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evidence prior to the adoption of a belief for us to judge it to be true or false. Call this type 
of evidential relation anterior. In certain cases, however, the evidence for a belief only comes 
after its adoption. Call this type of relation posterior. There is a further distinction which our 
discussion of the will-to-believe thesis allows us to make. What we have called the posterior 
evidential relation can be split into two types. Cases in which the adoption of a belief is 
required before evidence for or against that belief is made available (like the friendship case) 
might be called posterior non-productive. Cases in which the adoption of a belief is a factor in 
making that belief true (like the climber case) might be called posterior productive. As we have 
shown, we can find both types in James’s discussion, though he is not himself careful in 
distinguishing them. 
These distinctions allow us to be clearer on James’s relation to evidentialism. If evidentialism 
is understood as the thesis that the only thing which justifies the adoption of a belief at t1 is 
the evidence that we have at t1, then James’s will-to-believe position is a straightforward 
rejection of evidentialism. Cliffordian evidentialism is the position that the anterior evidential 
relation is the only thing which can legitimise the adoption of a belief.  In most cases, James 
agrees that establishing the truth of a belief prior to its adoption should be our ideal. When 
possible, when the evidence is available, or when we have no practical or temporal 
restrictions, we should continue “weighing reasons pro et contra with an indifferent hand” until 
we have sufficient evidence to judge the truth of a belief (1896, WB: 26). However, in certain 
cases we may legitimately adopt a belief on practical grounds and “at our own risk”, which 
can only be assessed subsequent to its adoption (1896, WB: 32). Nonetheless beliefs which 
are adopted without evidence at t1 can be later assessed, revised, and rejected in light of 
evidence at t2, and so demonstrate a posterior relation to evidence. 
In what follows, we shall focus on beliefs which have a posterior non-productive evidential 
relation. This is because James holds that religious belief is an example of this type. He makes 
this clear by interpreting religious belief under the analogy of friendship: 
[J]ust as a man who in a company of gentlemen made no advance, asked a warrant for every 
concession, and believed no-one's word without proof, would cut himself off by such churlishness 
from all the social rewards that a more trusting spirit would earn – so here, one who should shut 
himself up in snarling logicality and try to make the gods exhort his recognition willy-nilly, or not 
get it at all, might cut himself off forever from his only opportunity of making the god's acquaintance 
(1896, WB: 31). 
With religion, we must adopt belief (on practical grounds) before we have access to the 
evidence by which we assess it, but adopting this belief does not contribute to its truth. This is 
just as well. No whole-hearted religious believer is going to hold that the truth of their belief 
is dependent on their believing it.29 
                                            
29 Aikin (2014) seems to delineate a distinction similar to the one we draw between posterior productive and non-
productive cases. Aikin’s distinction is between what he calls evidentially productive doxastic efficacy and alethically 
productive doxastic efficacy (Aikin 2014: 159). However, he believes that James holds all his cases to be cases of 
the former, which loosely corresponds to our posterior productive evidential relation (Aikin 2014: 160). Aikin 
correctly asserts that such a position would fail to capture orthodox religious belief (Aikin 2014: 175). 
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At this point it is worth noting that, up till now, we have been talking as if the experience of 
one person is sufficient for assessing the truth or falsity of a religious belief. In fact, though 
James sometimes “for the sake of simplicity” talks as if this were the case, his considered 
opinion is that the “co-operation of generations” and the experience of the “entire human 
race” are required to assess beliefs of such scope (1882, WB: 87-8). This coheres with the 
long-established pragmatist view that truth emerges within a community of inquiry, rather 
than in the experience of one person.30 
In summary, James believes that we have practical grounds for the adoption of religious belief, 
but holds that these beliefs are evaluable in light of subsequent experience. It is clear that 
James, in posterior non-productive cases in particular, wants to separate the legitimate 
grounds for adopting a belief from the grounds on which we judge that belief to be justified. 31 
We are legitimately allowed to adopt religious belief on practical grounds, provided the option 
is live, forced, momentous, and unsettled by theoretical reason. Nonetheless we judge 
religious belief – like any other belief according to the pragmatist – to be true or false based 
on whether or not “the total drift of thinking continues to confirm it” (1896, WB: 24). Exactly 
what counts as evidence, for James, will be examined in the next section. 
 
§ III: KANT AND JAMES ON RELIGIOUS BELIEF AND EVIDENCE 
At first glance, it seemed that neither Kant nor James allowed evidence to play a role in 
matters of religious belief. For Kant God is an a priori practical postulate, and for James 
religious belief is something adopted for practical reasons. We have argued, however, that 
whereas Kant wants to insulate belief in God from the empirical world, James thinks that 
religious belief should be responsive to evidence, subsequent to its adoption.32 
                                            
30 See, for instance, Peirce (1868, CP5.311); Misak (2013: 60). 
31 In separating the legitimacy of belief adoption from the subsequent evaluation of the truth or falsity of that 
belief, we differ from the majority of traditional and contemporary interpretations. Pihlström, for instance, has 
recently argued that James is making a transcendental argument for God’s existence akin to Kant’s:  
 
James may be interpreted as arguing for the reality of God […] on moral grounds. The 
“religious hypothesis” is needed for us to be able to lead a “strenuous moral life”. It seems 
that we have to belief, or must reserve ourselves the right to believe, that God exists, in order 
to be able to take morality seriously and to avoid falling into moral nihilism – analogously to 
Kant’s “postulates of practical reason” (Pihlström 2014: 190). 
 
Though James does hold that there are practical moral benefits to religious belief (e.g. 1891, WB: 160), he is not 
making a transcendental argument for the existence of God. James’s argument in “The Will to Believe” aims only 
to legitimise the adoption of religious hypotheses, to be tested in future experience. This said, it may be that the 
practical moral benefits of a religious hypothesis might count as (coherentist or practical) evidence of its validity 
in the long run. 
32 This difference is emphasised by James himself, in his conclusion to Varieties of Religious Experience. There he 
contrasts his own “crass” religious theory, in which religious objects (if real) are expected to have phenomenal 
effects, with “Kantian” religious theories, which “bar […] ideal entities from interfering causally in the course 
of phenomenal events” (1902, VRE: 409). According to James, the idea: 
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To clarify our position, it will be worth contrasting our reading with another comparison 
between Kant and James. Marcus Willaschek (2010) argues that both Kant and James allow 
for adopting religious belief on practical grounds, and that neither Kant nor James allow 
evidence to play a role in the assessment of those beliefs. We agree with Willaschek on the 
first point, but disagree on the second.  
By ’evidence’, Willaschek means “considerations that tell in favour of p (i.e. in favour of the 
truth of that proposition)” (Willaschek 2010: 169n3). According to Willaschek: 
As Kant claims, there can be reasons for believing something which are not evidence in this sense, 
since these reasons do not bear on the truth of the proposition in question, but on the belief’s 
relation to the subject’s moral commitments. Hence, to deny that there is evidence for the 
propositions in question is not to deny that there are reasons for holding them (Willaschek 2010: 
169n3). 
The important insight of Kant (and James), according to Willaschek, is that there can be 
rational belief without evidence. 
We agree with this general point. However, we have argued that, according to James, though 
religious beliefs can be adopted on non-evidential practical grounds, they must subsequently 
be assessed on the basis of future evidence (with the added complication that the relevant 
experience is not available prior to the adoption of the belief). This however raises the 
question of what could count as evidence in the case of religious belief. Though James does 
not answer this question directly, we might distinguish three interrelated classes of evidence 
which he takes to be relevant to assessing religious belief: experiential evidence, coherentist 
evidence, and practical evidence. We shall briefly examine these in turn. 
What we call ‘experiential’ evidence is essentially empirical evidence. Upon adopting religious 
belief, believers might have access to specific phenomenal experiences which would indicate 
(to them) the truth of their belief. James is quite clear that “many persons […] possess the 
objects of their [religious] belief, not in the form of mere conceptions which their intellect 
accepts as true, but rather in the form of quasi-sensible realities directly apprehended” (1902, 
VRE: 59). Such beliefs are “as convincing to those who have them as any direct sensible 
experiences can be” (1902, VRE: 66), and without such experiences faith can become hollow 
and empty (1902, VRE: 59-60). According to James such religious experiences constitute 
“evidence exactly similar in nature” to those which are taken to be evidence in our more 
scientific inquiries (1902, VRE: 335). In principle, there is no epistemic difference between 
phenomenal experiences which indicate the truth of religious hypotheses and those which 
indicate the truth of physical hypotheses. Nonetheless, taken by themselves – as subjective 
experiences of the believer – such experiences are imperfect evidence, and without additional 
epistemic support from the other two types of evidence, they do not indicate truth any more 
                                            
[t]hat no concrete particular of experience should alter its complexion in consequence of a God being 
there seems to me an incredible proposition, and yet it is the thesis to which (implicitly at any rate) 
[Kantian religious theory] seems to cling (1902, VRE: 411). 
 
Were religious objects to exist, we ought to expect there to be experiences which would count as evidence for 
religious beliefs, whereas this is precisely what Kant denies. 
14 
 
than hallucinations do (1902, VRE: 377). The pragmatist connects truth with what community 
of inquirers would believe in the long run, and so such private experiences do not constitute 
adequate evidence.  
By coherentist evidence we mean indications that some particular hypothesis coheres with 
beliefs which we already hold to be true. When some new hypothesis fits nicely with things 
we already hold to be true, or offers additional explanation or unification, this is taken be 
evidence of its truth. Similarly, when the findings of one science confirm the findings of 
another, this indicates the truth of both. Though James holds that we should to some extent 
separate different spheres of inquiry from each other, if something we hold to be a fairly stable 
belief in one sphere flatly contradicts a hypothesis in another sphere, this might count as 
evidence of its falsity.33 For instance, James held that discoveries in the natural sciences, most 
notably Darwinism, disproved the religious hypothesis of natural theology. Under our current 
understanding of nature, the natural world cannot be seen as the expression of a perfect, 
benevolent deity (1895, WB: 43). Darwinism does not disprove all religious hypotheses, but 
it does limit the particular hypotheses which we can adopt. Similarly, the fact that our religious 
hypotheses cohere with and support our moral practices is – for James – indicative of their 
truth (1891, WB: 160).34 
The third type of evidence is what we call ‘practical’ evidence. Crudely put, James thinks that 
if a belief is useful or works in our experience, then this is indicative of its truth. It is this form 
of evidence that James puts the most weight on, and where we can see a crucial difference 
between Kant and James. Whereas Kant argues that practical reason gives us a priori grounds 
to believe in God, James holds that the practical role that religious beliefs play in our 
subsequent concrete experience, that is, whether or not they work, indicates the truth of 
those beliefs. 
James’ claim here follows from what classical pragmatists take truth to consist in. Though 
these pragmatists hold that a true proposition is one which agrees with reality, they deny the 
possibility of a theoretical stance in which this agreement can be determined a priori. The truth 
of a proposition must instead be demonstrated by its working. A true belief would be one 
which better enabled us to operate on, and more accurately predict, future experience. We 
thus have good reason for holding that a belief that works is a true belief. Conversely, a belief 
which encountered problems when applied to experience would be rightly doubted, and 
                                            
33 We might think that some coherentist evidence might well be available prior to the adoption of a religious 
belief, and that this would tell against our claim that evidence for religious beliefs are only available subsequent 
to adoption. This seems correct, to an extent. A potential belief being coherent with our already held beliefs 
seems to be one component to it being consider plausible, and thus live. However, accepting this is consistent 
with holding that other coherentist evidence is only available after adoption. Sometimes it is only once we adopt 
and act under a belief that we see whether it coheres with all our other commitments, or continues to cohere 
with other beliefs which we adopt later. 
34 Stern (2015) has recently argued that both Kant and James are coherentists about freedom. According to 
Stern, both thinkers hold that the idea of freedom coheres with and supports our moral beliefs and practices, 
and this counts as evidence for the truth of freedom. If Stern is correct, then it might be argued that Kant allows 
for some notion of evidence – coherentist evidence – to play a role in the legitimisation of religious belief. On 
this reading of Kant, the fact that belief in God supports our commitment to the highest good might indicate the 
truth of that belief. 
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judged in need of revision or rejection. An absolutely true belief would be one which always 
worked, and which “no farther experience [would] ever alter” (1907, P: 106).35 
According to James’s Darwinian inspired epistemology, by testing our various beliefs within 
our own experience, and against that of other people’s, we allow reality to “select” for true 
beliefs. Though all classical pragmatists share some form of this epistemology, James is unique 
among the pragmatists in that he applies it to religious beliefs: 
If religious hypotheses about the universe be in order at all, then the active faiths of individuals in 
them, freely expressing themselves in life, are the experimental tests by which they are verified, 
and the only means by which their truth and falsehood can be wrought out. The truest scientific 
hypothesis is that which, as we say, “works” best; and it can be no otherwise with religious 
hypotheses. Religious history proves that one hypothesis after another has worked ill, has crumbled 
at contact with a widening knowledge of the world, and has lapsed from the minds of men. Some 
articles of faith, however, have maintained themselves through every vicissitude, and possess even 
more vitality today than ever before […]  Meanwhile the freest competition of the various faith 
with one another, and their openest application to life by their several champions, are the most 
favourable condition under which the survival of the fittest can proceed (1896, WB: 8).36 
In certain carefully delimited contexts, James allows individuals to adopt religious beliefs on 
practical and personal grounds. Through doing so, these individuals gain access to the practical 
experience through which these beliefs can be assessed. Whether these beliefs are satisfying 
in the long run, whether they stand up to external criticism, and whether they allow us to 
successfully predict and act in future experience, are the kinds of experimental tests by which 
we assess them. This “working” is what we mean by practical evidence. According to James, 
in such matters we “cannot possibly conceive of any other sort of ‘evidence’ or ‘proof’ than 
this”. Over the course of “the experience of the entire human race”, through such experiential 
tests, we move closer to absolutely true beliefs (1882, WB: 87-88). 
The major difference between the two thinkers then, is that whereas Kant conceives of 
religious belief as insulated from the world of experience, James opens religious beliefs to 
assessment through their application to concrete experience. When Kant defends belief in 
God on practical grounds, he means that theoretical reason leaves the matter undecided, but 
that we nonetheless have necessary and a priori grounds for believing in God if we are to fulfil 
our practical duties. Such practical grounds do not count as evidence of God’s existence, in 
the sense of telling favour of the truth of that proposition, but are instead rational 
requirements for practical reason.37 When James defends religious belief on practical grounds, 
he means that theoretical reason leaves the matter undecided, but that believers are (subject 
                                            
35 Or as Peirce would put it, truth is “a state of belief unassailable by doubt” (1905, CP5.416). 
36 James says something similar in his Pragmatism lectures: 
 
On pragmatistic principles, if the hypothesis of God works satisfactorily in the widest sense of 
the word, it is true. Now whatever its residual difficulties may be, experience shows that it 
certainly does work, and that the problem is to build it out and determine it, so that it will 
combine satisfactorily with all the other working truths (1907, P: 143). 
 
Here we see the clear application of what we have called practical and coherentist evidence to religious belief.  
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to certain limitations) free to adopt a belief which they find plausible and meaningful. James’s 
practical grounds are not a priori and necessary postulates of practical reason, but they 
nonetheless may have some significant impact on our moral practices. James’s kind of practical 
grounds do not count as evidence either. However, James does leave room for the subsequent 
experience of how these beliefs work when applied to reality to count as practical evidence, in 
the sense of telling in favour (or against) the truth of some religious proposition. 
Here it is worth noting that, in the Canon of Pure Reason, Kant seems to allow that some beliefs 
can be adopted through practical considerations, but later defeated on theoretical grounds.38 
And indeed, when it comes to the highest good and Kant’s argument for God as a postulate, 
Kant only offers this practical argument because he thinks that theoretical reason cannot 
settle the issue either way. However, importance differences still remains between Kant and 
James’ accounts on this. For one, Kant thinks that the highest good is inseparably connected 
to a necessary object of practical reason; James by contrast, does not conceive of practical 
grounds in terms of necessity. Relatedly, as we have seen, James thinks that we should assess 
how our religious beliefs work after we’ve adopted them. And finally, to repeat one of our 
main claims, for James, whether or not religious beliefs work counts in favour of the truth of 
these beliefs.  
What is the upshot of these differences? One concrete consequence concerns atheism. 
According to Kant, belief in God is a necessary practical postulate, and as such atheism is 
rejected as irrational. For James, on the other hand, there is nothing irrational about being an 
atheist. In fact, both the atheist and the religious believer are, according to James, engaged in 
the same philosophical project of trying to make sense of the world, and their different 
hypotheses can be judged by the same criteria. Both adopt hypotheses about the way the 
world is based on personal and practical grounds. And both should be free to act according 
to their own hypotheses, gathering relevant evidence for assessing them, and revising or 
rejecting them when appropriate. Over time, one view will perhaps show itself to be more 
attuned to our lived experience, more coherent with other beliefs which we hold to be true, 
and more practical, and so the continued drift of human thought will confirm it. But it is only 
through actual experience and conversation that such a conclusion could be reached. For 
now, we can only adopt the hypotheses which appeal to us, and subject them to our own – 
and other’s – lived experience.  
However, in suggesting that religious belief should be seen as a ‘hypothesis’, subject to the 
same epistemic norms as other beliefs, James’s theory might be seen as problematically 
revisionary. A traditional religious believer might object that our faith in God must be held in 
the face of substantive negative experience, and must be held with a surety which rejects 
fallible ‘hypothesis’ talk. So, by trying to make religious belief more plausible to the scientifically 
minded, James may end up alienating the more traditional religious believer. Kant’s theory, on 
the other hand, suggests that religious faith is unshakeable no matter what, and as such 
captures the intuitions of a certain type of religious believer. 
                                            
38 See A 824-5/ B 852-3. We are grateful to an anonymous referee at the EJP for pointing us to this passage. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
According to both Kant and James, theoretical reason leaves religious belief unsettled. Rather 
than abandoning religious belief in the face of theoretical reason’s insufficiency, both thinkers 
turn to practical reason to ground religious belief. But, despite apparent similarities, we have 
argued that the two thinkers differ significantly in the way they go about this. Whereas Kant 
argues that belief in God is a necessary a priori practical postulate, James treats religious belief 
as a hypothesis which is adopted on practical and personal grounds. And whereas Kant 
insulates religious belief from the world of experience, James holds religious beliefs to be 
revisable or rejectable in the light of subsequent experience. In particular, we have shown that 
according to James, whether or not a religious belief works counts as evidence for its truth 
or falsity. In short, James opens religious belief to experience in ways that Kant does not. 
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